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Abstract
This paper develops a series of information-theoretic measures to consider the systemic
effects on individual incomes of complex patterns of social and economic discrimination by race,
ethnicity, and gender, in the U.S. It derives coefficients of joint, conditional or incremental,
and mutual information that offer non-parametric characterizations of the relative influence
of economic and social-identity characteristics in the determination of individual income for
different groups. It reports on estimates of those coefficients obtained using large-scale crosssectional data from that economy. Those estimates support two sets of conclusions. First, the
informational significance of social identity in the determination of incomes differs clearly and
persistently across social-identity groups. For some groups social identity exerts a significant
informational influence in the determination of income. Other groups enjoy greater scopes
for individual differentiation by factors other than social identity. Second, the informational
influence of educational attainment on income is deeply shaped by social identity. Among other
expressions of this, the paper finds that some identity groups see the comparative measure of
informational association between their incomes and educational attainment rise steadily with
levels of educational attainment. In contrast, other groups see those comparative measures fall
as educational attainment rises. These observations point to the economic effects systems of
discrimination impose on certain groups, and to the relative privileges enjoyed by those not
subjected to them.
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Introduction

Income inequality is a paramount form of social differentiation in decentralized market economies. It
embodies differences in the measures of market command over social resources different individuals
secure over a given time period. Distributions of income are thus an observable expression of
a highly consequential social outcome in those economies: The market distribution of the social
product across individuals and groups of individuals.
While most immediately determined in markets, individual incomes also express a broad range
of irreducibly social relationships between groups of people.1 This is clear in the overwhelming
preponderance in the top ranges of national income distributions of individuals whose incomes primarily consist of profits (or other forms of propertied income drawing on profits), and the converse
dominance of wages over everybody else’s incomes. This attests to the ongoing social significance in
contemporary capitalist economies of class—as understood in the salient contributions of Classical
Political Economy.2 It is even clearer in the continued absence of any income accruing to household
reproductive labor, carried out overwhelmingly by women, which gives sharp expression to ongoing
patterns of iniquity by gender in the contemporary organization of economic activity.3
Canonical microeconomic approaches to the distribution of income have emphasized the role of
important contemporaneous individual characteristics in the market determination of income,4 like
the preferences and knowledge states of the parties involved, the stocks of financial and “human”
capital individuals wish to engage productively, and the prices at which they succeed in doing so.
But those current characteristics themselves are cumulative outcomes of social and economic processes.5 Stocks of financial capital reflect past, often inter-generational wealth accumulation. Levels
of education, skills, and work experience reflect much of the detail of personal, educational, and
professional histories, as well as the accumulated results of much paid and unpaid labor performed
by others during those histories. And complex social processes shape attitudes, expectations, and
knowledge states conditioning all aspects of individuals’ engagement with labor markets and its
1

Marx, 1970; Polanyi, 2001.
Smith, 1982; Ricardo, 1951; Marx, 1919.
3
See Fraser, 1994; Folbre, 1994 and Wood, 2002, for instance.
4
Debreu, 1959; G. Becker, 1957.
5
Abbott, 1983; Abbott, 1995; Folbre, 2012; Cheng, 2014.
2

2

outcomes.
Patterns of social discrimination by elements of individuals’ social identity—like their gender,
race, ethnicity, or class background—exert an important influence on these processes, their outcomes, and their implications for income. Discriminatory treatment generally yields less favorable
outcomes for women, minorities, and individuals with lower socio-economic status at each step
along the cumulative processes shaping an individual’s observable economic characteristics. It
is also well understood that individuals with comparable observable economic characteristics are
systematically treated differently in labor markets according to social identity.
As a result, individual incomes established in markets reflect more than just individual characteristics and contingencies capable of shaping economic trajectories and outcomes. They give
observable and quantifiable expression to the functioning of social systems of discrimination. While
this represents a potential boon for inquiry into the nature of social discrimination, drawing on
those distributions to make detailed inferences about the influence of social identity on income poses
a number of difficulties. The interrelationships in question are dynamic and complex. They involve
non-linearities, path dependences, as well as the influence of unobservable characteristics, social
interactions and processes. Efforts to draw on observation to estimate parameters in strongly specified models of particular mechanisms or specific influences involved are unlikely to yield successful
characterizations.
In contrast, comparisons of distributions of individual income, observable economic characteristics, and observable elements of social identity can cast light onto the aggregate or systemic
economic manifestations and effects of social discrimination. In the absence of economically meaningful patterns of discrimination by social identity, marginal distributions of income in a market
economy would not differ systematically across observable social identity groups. Those distributions would be shaped in the same manner by the same sets of individual characteristics, social
processes, vagaries and contingencies influencing individual incomes.6 Similarly, in the absence of
discrimination joint distributions of income and observable economic characteristics would also be
comparable across social-identity groups. Observable economic characteristics would have compa6
Note that this could include additional, unobservable patterns of discrimination by socially relevant individual
characteristics that may have little to do with productivity.
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rable aggregate effects on income for all such groups.
It is in this connection that the present paper makes a set of innovative methodological and
empirical contributions. It draws on Information Theory to develop a series of indices of joint,
conditional or incremental, and mutual informational association between sets of individual economic and social-identity characteristics and individual income. Those indices offer non-parametric,
purely informational characterizations of the influence and interactions between these sets of characteristics in the determination of individual income. Their development leads to three general
formal results that can assist inquiry into influences and interactions involving two sets of variables
in the determination of a quantity of interest.
The paper applies these indices and results to large-scale cross-sectional data sets constructed
from the U.S. census to cast light on the emergent influence of race, ethnicity, and gender on
aggregate patterns of income in that economy.7 This results in a series of new or newly framed
conclusions about the economic effects of social patterns of discrimination. It also illustrates the
usefulness of information-theoretic inquiry in seeking to make inferences about the functioning of
complex socio-economic systems from observable outcomes.8 Most broadly, the paper establishes
that the pattern of differentiation among individuals and its association with observable economic
characteristics differs systematically across social-identity groups. Two significant informational
features of these differences stand out.
First, there are persistent differences between social-identity groups in the heterogeneity or
diversity of income, as measured by the entropy of their distributions of individuals across income
levels. For instance, data for 2010 show almost 15 percent less diversity in the incomes of Hispanic
women than in the incomes of all people sampled. Put differently, observing that a person is a
Hispanic woman is highly informative, in that it reduces uncertainty about her income by almost
15 percent. In contrast, the distribution for white men had five percent more diversity than the
entire sample distribution. We know less about a given individual’s income after we learn they are
a white man.
This is a significant finding. It suggests some identity groups enjoy not only comparatively
7
8

Unfortunately this rich and large dataset does not capture any reliable measure of class background.
As such this paper builds on a tradition started by Theil, 1971 and Theil and Finezza, 1971.
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Figure 1: Identity and annual wage data for white men and hispanic women in 2010 ACS.
higher average incomes, but also greater scopes for income differentiation by characteristics other
than their social identity. Others face narrower ranges of economic outcomes, as can be seen in
Figure 1 and Figure 2. This is true not only for unconditional distributions of income across socialidentity groups, but also for distributions of income across identity groups with the same observable
economic characteristics.
The paper shows formally how differences in entropy across income distributions ensure that
the comparative, incremental informational significance of social identity relative to that of any
set of economic characteristic in the determination of income will always be greater among women
and minorities than among white men. The extent to which the complex, dynamic socio-economic
processes shaping levels of individual income effectively treat individuals on the basis of their social
identity is systematically greater for some social-identity groups. Discrimination by social identity
involves a comparative failure to discriminate among individuals belonging to certain identity groups
on the basis of the content of their individual economic characteristics.
Second, the paper establishes important differences in the informational association educational
achievement has with incomes across different identity groups. Certain combinations of educational
achievement and social identity have “informational synergies” in their associations with individual

5

income. “Being white and having a college degree” is more informative about a person’s income
than the sum of the separate informational associations of “being white” and “being a college
graduate” with individual incomes. Significantly, this is not the case for other university-educated
groups. Conversely, being a woman and having a low level of formal education is more informative
about a person’s income than the sum of the informational associations of being a woman and that
of having a low level of formal education. This effect does not apply to men with low levels of
formal educational achievement.
In both cases this suggests the combination of characteristics in question is statistically associated with further characteristics and processes that shape the effect of educational attainment on
distributions of income. Those processes ensure high levels of educational attainment are unusually
informative of incomes for whites, and low levels of educational attainment unusually informative
of incomes for women. In fact, the paper shows how the comparative informational significance
of educational attainment for the income of women consistently decreases as levels of education
increase. In contrast, that comparative informational significance consistently increases as levels of
education increase for white men. Returns on education are part of broader social processes shaped
by gender, race, and ethnicity in ways that effectively generate greater rewards for high educational
achievement for whites and impose greater losses on low levels of formal education on women. They
appear to embody forms of discrimination by social identity, with important implications for our
understanding of how individuals and societies can strive to make progress against discrimination
and its economic consequences.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two offers a discussion on the complex, dynamic
relationship between social identity and income and motivates the need for a systemic approach to
its study. Section three discusses fundamental information theoretic concepts and their applications
to analysis of complex socio-economic systems. Section four derives indices of joint, incremental,
and mutual information and establishes a few formal results involving them that can be used in
such applications. Section five reports on estimates of those indices obtained using successive
cross-sections of U.S. data, and discusses their significance. Section six concludes the paper with
a discussion on the understanding of the economic effects of discrimination by elements of social
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Figure 2: Marginal wage distributions by identity, 2010 ACS
identity, and of the kind of privilege some groups enjoy, suggested by the perspective offered in this
paper.

2

Social Identity and Income

The influence of social identity on income is well established. Many studies have considered its effect
on a broad range of labor-market outcomes among individuals with the same observed economic
characteristics. Experimental contributions from sociologists and economists have established patterns of discrimination against women and minorities in hiring across several advanced economies
by considering the comparative fortunes of controlled pairs of fictitious job applicants.9 Other contributions have established that women and minorities are over (under) represented in occupations
with lower (higher) average measures of pay, even after accounting for educational attainment.10
They also tend to receive lower incomes than white, male peers performing the same jobs.11
9

See Quillian et al. (2017), which reports on a large-scale meta-analysis of several such studies undertaken in
the U.S. has estimated that white job applicants enjoy on average 36 and 24 percent more callbacks than otherwise
comparable black and Latino applicants, respectively. See also Daniel, 1968; Jowell and Wissoker, 1970; Firth, 1981;
Firth, 1982; Riach and Rich, 1987; Kenney and Wissoker, 1994; M Bendick and Reinoso, 1994; Riach and Rich, 2002.
10
Hamilton et al., 2011; Kossek et al., 2016, etc.
11
Joshl and Paci, 2001
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Contemporary economic theory has offered two broad approaches for thinking about the influence of discrimination by social identity on incomes and other market outcomes. It is possible to
consider that individual consumers, employers and workers have preferences that are biased against
certain social groups; so much so that they are willing to act on those biases even in the face of
pecuniary losses.12 As a result, workers belonging to those groups are employed less often and
typically at lower wages than other workers. It is also possible to consider that employers carry
out “statistical discrimination,” relying on perceived associations between elements of social identity and unobservable productive characteristics when making hiring decisions.13 Both approaches
are capable of drawing out a number of undesirable economic and odious ethical consequences of
discrimination—including social and individual economic losses consequent to biases and stereotypes. And the idea of “statistical discrimination” gets to the very substance of social pre-judice:
The judgement of individuals not by the content of their character, but by prior and incorrect
beliefs about associations between observable markers of social identity and individual economic
characteristics.
Despite this, the methodological choice of taking individual preferences and beliefs as given
leaves no scope for explicit consideration of the complex, dynamic interrelationships between the
attitudes, expectations, and actions that define discrimination by social identity, the evolving economic characteristics of individuals, and their employment and income outcomes. This is a significant shortcoming in any attempt to develop empirically grounded characterizations of the influence
of social identity on aggregate patterns of income distribution.
This section briefly discusses the growing body of evidence documenting the impact of discrimination on a broad range of outcomes shaping individual incomes. It also discusses important
methodological implications of these findings, including on why systemic conceptualizations of the
economic effects of patterns of discrimination are far more appropriate than individualist, microkinetic approaches as bases for observational work.
12
13

G. Becker, 1957; Arrow, 1971.
Phelps, 1972
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2.1

Identities and the Social Construction of Economic Characteristics

An individual’s present income is an outcome of a succession of social and economic processes
taking place over their lifetime.14 Those processes condition economic characteristics like education, skills, experience, and preferences that shape that individual’s present engagement with
labor markets. A growing body of contributions from Psychology, Epidemiology, Pedagogy, Sociology, Development Studies, Anthropology, and Political Economy have established how at every
step along the way, patterns of discrimination by socio-economic status and social identity shape
individual economic outcomes. As a result, the distribution of present economic characteristics
differs across socio-economic status and social identity, reinforcing—in turn—discriminatory social
attitudes, expectations, and interactions.
From infancy, parents may effectively favor boys in the allocation of household resources affecting future labor-market outcomes, like food, parental attention, and educational expenditures.15
The same may be true for children with phenotypical traits associated with more favorable racial
classifications in a given society.16 Favored children generally benefit from preferential treatment—
as well as from the broader social advantages that motivate it—and achieve better average outcomes,
giving real measures of self-fulfilling, social validation to parental discrimination.
In formal education, a growing literature points to the presence and academic consequences of
teacher discrimination of students, in some cases as early as pre-school.17 Patterns of low academic
expectations by educators and students resulting in low educational achievement continue through
all levels of education, including college.18 Experiences with discrimination by teachers and peers
can increase measures of physical stress suffered by young students and impair their cognitive
development.19 Minority students also have disproportionately high rates of poverty, which is
often associated with poor nutrition and adverse health outcomes that have been linked to poor
14

Abbott, 1983; Abbott, 1995; Cheng, 2014.
See Behrman et al., 1986; Rosenzweig and Shultz, 1982, for instance.
16
Rangel, 2015.
17
See Gilliam et al., 2016; Gershenson and Papageorge, 2018; Rosenbloom and Way, 2004; Greene et al., 2006;
Wong et al., 2003, for instance.
18
Thomas, 2017.
19
See Levy et al., 2016; Brown, 2015.
15
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educational achievement and lower measures of adult productivity and income.20
Beyond education, processes of socialization reproduce differential expectations, preferences,
and attitudes across social identities, with significant effects on labor-market outcomes. Socially
accepted gender roles define different ranges of behavior deemed acceptable or appropriate, including behaviors associated with career success and higher earnings.21 Work and career preferences,
as well as attitudes toward competing family and professional demands, are deeply shaped by traditional gendered expectations and beliefs concerning what jobs and functions are appropriate for
men and women.22 The economic significance of gendered work and career expectations will be
greatest in settings where wage differentials between “women’s work” and other jobs are large, and
in settings where good-quality child and elder care services and paid family leave are not widely
accessible.
Conventional beliefs about the capacities and characteristics of individuals across different social
identities shape both the kinds of jobs individuals seek and the kinds of jobs they get. Differential
patterns of occupancy across jobs help perpetuate those beliefs, as they create role models for
both wage earners and employers.23 They also perpetuate iniquities as some groups are underrepresented in the kinds of jobs that create more opportunities for further career advancement.24
Finally, a substantial literature has established important patterns of iniquity and discrimination
of “class migrants” in professional careers.25 Despite wide evidence that people from working-class
backgrounds often have unique skills and ability their peers from more privileged backgrounds
may lack, they still report that their background adversely affects their career outcomes. They
themselves report lower levels of belonging, and are less often seen as a “good fit” with a particular
workplace as a result of their ignorance of tacit class rules and conventions.
The effects of such multifaceted patterns of discrimination on economic outcomes are profound.
20
See Darmon and Drewnowski, 2008; Drewnowski and Darmon, 2005; Taveras et al., 2010; Larson and Story,
2011; Strauss and Thomas, 1998; Hoddinott et al., 2008; Bhargava, 2008, for instance.
21
Udry, 1994, etc.
22
See Kossek, 2006; Martins et al., 2002; Lavassani and Movahedi, 2014; Lawson et al., 2015; Kossek et al., 2016,
for instance.
23
See Hilton and W. von Hippel, 2012; C. von Hippel et al., 2015; Eagly and Karau, 2002; Heilman, 2012, for
instance.
24
Kanter, 1977.
25
See the succinct summary of these contributions offered by Williams et al., 2018.
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Even the manner in which cognitive and non-cognitive traits at childhood and adolescence shape
future educational achievement and income is fundamentally defined by a person’s background and
social identity. The personality traits associated with higher rates of college completion are very
different across student socio-economic status.26 Among other characteristics, adult entrepreneurs
have been found to have engaged in illicit activities in adolescence at relatively high rates.27 As the
adverse consequences for illicit behavior differ drastically across social identities,28 the opportunity
to put one’s risk-seeking appetites to potentially productive uses is unequally distributed across
potential entrepreneurs. Finally, associations between childhood externalizing behaviors, like aggression, a willingness to disobey rules, cheat, and steal,29 and higher adult incomes have been
found in British data for individuals with high childhood socio-economic status,30 but not for others. Notably, reductions in childhood externalizing behaviors have also been found to be associated
with increases in future income among disadvantaged black children in the United States.31 Some
personality traits that can help some people achieve better economic outcomes have the opposite
effects for members of other socio-economic groups.

2.2

Methodological Implications

The findings of these and related contributions strongly suggest that economic discrimination by
elements of social identity is not reducible to individual preferences or beliefs about unobservable
characteristics of workers. Neither is it simply the heterogeneous treatment of economically equivalent individuals. It reflects the operation of social systems defined by self-reinforcing processes
taking place both within and beyond markets. Economic outcomes and social attitudes, expectations, and actions feed back on each other, systemically reproducing patterns of iniquity by social
identity.32
26

Lundberg, 2013.
Levine and Rubinstein, 2013.
28
Not only has the criminal justice system especially targeted types of offences “for which black and Hispanic
people often are disproportionately arrested and convicted” (Council, 2014, , p. 91), racial disparities in the severity of
sentencing have also been found as the cumulative effect of “small but systematic racial differences in case processing”
(Council, 2014, , p. 103).
29
Liu, 2004.
30
Papageorge et al., 2017.
31
Heckman and Kautz, 2013.
32
See Folbre, 2012 others on systems of oppression.
27
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Within those processes, the role of social identity in conditioning incomes is multifaceted, dynamic, and complex. This has important methodological implications.
Individualist approaches, which predicate labor-market outcomes on detailed descriptions of
given individual characteristics and the micro-level interactions they define, face both practical
and conceptual difficulties in analysis of this role. Individual characteristics are ever-changing
moments in a broader set of complex processes of social determination. There is no reason to expect
parametrizations that take those characteristics as given will be particularly advantageous in inquiry
into the full, independent effect social identities have on income. In fact, such approaches are assured
to flounder in attempts to give them empirical foundations. Many of the parameters involved
relate to unobservables, like subjective states. And the frequencies at which individual states may
be observed are generally far lower than the frequencies at which interactions change individual
economic states, and possibly individuals themselves. What can be observed are not inherently
individual characteristics, but the accumulation of the outcomes of a series of unobservable social
interactions.33 To use such observation to infer parameters in models of individual behavior is to
make a category mistake.
Conceptually, individualist parametrizations take as given patterns of heterogeneity and iniquity
in current individual economic characteristics and behaviors that have been conditioned by previous
social and economic interactions.34 This leaves no space for explicit consideration of the processes
conditioning these heterogeneities, generally resulting in an underestimation of the full measure and
significance of elements of social identity in the determination of the distribution of social output.
An important case in point is the influential approach to the determination of individual incomes defined by the “human capital” framework articulated by Schultz, 1961 and G. S. Becker,
33

See dos Santos, 2017.
Economics has a long record of starting analysis by taking present states that reflect dynamic social and economic
iniquities as given. This was already evident in Ricardo, 1951’s advocacy of free trade base on the concept of
comparative advantage—the ability to reallocate domestic resources to produce more of one good while sacrificing
fewer units of other goods than other countries. In Ricardo’s celebrated example, trade between Portugal and
England is taken as advantageous to both countries since Portugal has a comparative advantage in producing wine,
while England’s advantage lies in production of cloth. The choice of “wine” for Portugal in Ricardo’s thought exercise
was not innocuous. It evokes inherent, climatological differences between the two countries. But cloth is different—its
production in England reflected processes of mechanisation that embodied and opened possibilities for further gains
in absolute and comparative advantages. Ricardo’s analytical choice effectively disappeared the economic privileges
enjoyed by the English economy in international trade.
34
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1962. That framework, which most broadly characterizes an individual’s income as a yield on
their investment in skills, education, and experience, has inspired a voluminous literature seeking
to account for observed individual incomes as the result of individual “human capital” investment
choices.35
If “human capital” is simply the discounted present or capitalized value of all future earnings,
the theory can become expansive to the point of being vacuous: Any distribution of wages can
be attributed to a particular distribution of unobserved human capital. Seen from the perspective
afforded by the contributions discussed above, the resulting approaches underemphasize important
systemic, social determinants and costs of education, skills, and experience, while exaggerating the
influence of “individual investment choice” in determining individual productive characteristics.
An alternative, systemic conceptualization of the economic effects of social identity can enable
practical work without these difficulties. It is possible to consider that through the kinds of complex, dynamic processes discussed above, socio-economic systems reproduce macroscopic patterns
of heterogeneity in economic outcomes across large social-identity groups. Those patterns should be
understood as exclusively social, in that they have no foundation outside of those systems.36 They
are the systemic economic expression of discrimination by social identity. Their formal characteristics contain information about emergent, macroscopic associations between social identity and
different observable economic characteristics and outcomes. Information Theory makes it possible
to characterize and quantify those associations, casting new light onto the systemic expressions of
discrimination in the processes through which a political economy distributes the social product.
35

See the influential contribution by Mincer, 1974 and the synthetic review in Ashenfelter et al., 1999.
Specifically, race and ethnicity are social categories with no biological bases. The genetic variability across the
different sets of distinctive human populations that constitute various racial and ethnic categories are very small
compared to the overall genetic variability across humanity as a whole (See Yu et al., 2002; Witherspoon et al., 2007,
for instance). Sex is obviously a biological category, which very likely conditions important elements of behavior in
our species (Udry, 1994). But the economic consequences of sex-dimorphic behaviors are expressions of gender, and
reflect how the economic organization of a society generally favors one set of its members over another. There is no
a priori reason why market incomes should be allocated differently according to sex.
36
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3

Drawing on Information Theory

Information Theory offers distinctively useful tools enabling formal inferences about complex patterns of economic and social interaction based on their observable outcomes. This section discusses
two central information theoretic concepts that can help guide observational inquiry into the associations between economic and social characteristics of individuals and their income: entropy and
mutual information.
To see this, consider an economic or social system as composed of a large number N of individual
members. At any given point in time, each of those members has an individual state defined over a
set of k + 1 degrees of freedom, X = {X0 , X1 , ..., Xk }. Individual degrees of freedom may describe
quantifiable individual characteristics as well as macroscopic quantities that take the same value
across a large number of individuals in the system. They may also describe qualitative or categorical
individual characteristics. Coding schemes mapping the latter characteristics onto distinct real
numbers allow individual states to be represented by a vector x = {x0 , x1 , ..., xk }, with the set of
all such individual states denoted by T ⊆ Rk+1 .
The macroscopic state of the system can be defined over a “coarse-graining” of T into s bins, as a
frequency function f (x0 , x1 , ..., xk ) = f (x) describing the normalized occupancy of each individualstate bin.37 The functioning of a system defines a phase space Φ containing all macroscopic states
f (x) the system may actually occupy. The laws and regularities that define a system are given
statistical expression in the shape of Φ.
In observational social science we typically face variations of the following analytical problem
within this setting: We can observe the values taken by v ≤ k + 1 individual degrees of freedom
across n < N members of the system. This allows construction of frequency histograms f (xv )
over the values taken by the vector xv of observed individual states. We have limited knowledge of
the micro-level interactions driving the functioning of the system, as those are either unobservable
or involve non-linearities and high-frequency interactions that make it very difficult to draw on
37

Note that coarse graining of the domain for a quantitative individual degree of freedom can be understood as a
distinctive type of categorical coding: one where the quantity associated with the category defined by the occupancy
of a bin—typically the central value taken by the degree of freedom in the bin—is relevant to the functioning of the
system.
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observation to characterize them.38 And we generally do not know the full set X of relevant degrees
of freedom. But we would like to draw on what we observe to infer as much as we can about the
functioning of the social or economic system at hand. Formally, we want to develop increasingly
accurate descriptions of the shape of Φ.
In this connection the concept of entropy is distinctively useful. The entropy H (Y) for any set
of degrees of freedom Y in a state f , defined over m bins, is a measure of the statistical weight
Wf of that macroscopic state across all possible micro-level configurations of individual members
across all bins. Formally,
m

X
log Wf
=−
H (Y) =
fi log fi
N

(1)

i=1

Note that this quantity can also be understood as a measure of the diversity or heterogeneity in the
values taken by Y. If all individuals are in the same bin, 1 ensures entropy is zero. If individuals
are evenly distributed across all m bins—a state of maximum diversity or heterogeneity—entropy
reaches its maximum value: log m. It should be obvious that a change in the state of a single
individual results in an increase in entropy if and only if the change takes that individual to a state
with lower occupancy than the state it originally occupied. That is, entropy increases only when
diversity or heterogeneity increases.39
Entropy is useful in analysis of systems with large N >> m for at least two reasons. First, for
those systems the combinatorial dominance of the distribution f ∗ achieving maximum entropy over
their phase spaces is overwhelming. If we know the shape of the phase space for such a system, we
should generally expect to observe macroscopic behavior in line with a state f ∗ .
A converse application of this observation is particularly useful in observational work in political economy.40 Sometimes measured frequencies f (xv ) over the system’s v observable individual
degrees of freedom are consistently well described by known, closed-form functional forms. Those
38

See dos Santos, 2017.
For a formal proof of this observation for changes in any number of individual states, see the Appendix in dos
Santos and Scharfenaker, 2018.
40
See Stanley et al., 1996; Bottazzi and Secchi, 2003; Bottazzi and Secchi, 2006; Alfarano and Milaković, 2008;
Alfarano and Milaković, 2008; Scharfenaker and dos Santos, 2015; dos Santos and Scharfenaker, 2018, for instance.
39
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functional forms are often entropy maxima over phase spaces defined by known moment constraints
on the distribution of xv . It can be inferred that those constraints are good descriptions of the
observable section of the system’s phase space, Φv ⊂ Φ. All interactions and influences involving
observed and non-observed degrees of freedom effectively resolve themselves into those constraints.
They are the emergent, systemic expression of the outcome of those interactions and influences.41
Observationally successful theories of those processes must be formally equivalent to those constraints, which give us formal clues about the macroscopic or social content of the micro-processes
at hand.

3.1

Uncertainty and Mutual Information

Entropy is also useful in settings where observed distributions are not well described by known,
closed-form functional forms. Entropy is a measure of the uncertainty we have about the exact
micro-level configuration of a system at a macroscopic state f (x). Depending on the base of
the logarithm used in 1, entropy measures the average number of bits, nats, or dits necessary to
enumerate all Wf micro-level configurations in which the system may find itself at that state.
This measure of what we do not know about the micro state of a system motivates the concept
of mutual information. The mutual information between two degrees of freedom is given by,

I (Xi , Xj ) = H (Xi ) − H (Xi |Xj ) = H (Xi ) −

X

f (xj ) H (Xi |xj )

(2)

xj

This is a quantification of the average reduction in our uncertainty about Xi when we observe
the distribution of Xj : The change in the average number of bits, nats, or dits needed to enumerate
or identify uniquely each micro-level configuration compatible with observation when move from
observing only Xi to observing Xi and Xj . Mutual information can also be thought of as a measure
of the information shared between the two quantities, in that it quantifies how much we learn about
41
Most generally, we are interested in settings where observed distributions are consistently well described by
Lambert-W functions, which include all maxima for generalized, (c, d) entropy functionals. In cases where (c, d) 6=
(1, 1) we have non-Shannon entropies and systems where some interactions can be most conveniently understood to
resolve themselves not into macroscopic constraints we may infer but into non-extensive dependences of the system’s
phase-space volume on the number of members in the system. See Hanel and Thurner, 2011.

16

one of them from observation of the other.
The multivariate generalization of mutual information requires careful consideration. As motivated by McGill, 1954; Fano, 1961; Han, 1980, note that I (Xi , Xj ) = I (Xi ) − I (Xi |Xj ), where
the self mutual information I (Y ) = H (Y ). By extension,

I (X0 , X1 , X2 ) = I (X0 , X1 ) − I (X0 , X1 |X2 )

(3)

where the conditional mutual information I (X0 , X1 |X2 ) = H (X0 |X2 ) − H (X0 |X1 , X2 ) measures
the information gained about X0 upon observation of X1 when X2 is already known. The tripartite mutual information in 3 is a measure of the information shared by all three variables: the
information shared by X0 and X1 , minus the part of that shared information not contained in X2 .
The general multivariate mutual information can be defined recursively,

I (X0 , X1 , ..., Xk ) = I (X0 , X1 , ..., Xk−1 ) − I (X0 , X1 , ..., Xk−1 |Xk )

(4)

The mutual information between all k + 1 variables measures the shared informational content of
the first k variables minus the part of that content not contained in Xk .42

3.2

Joint Mutual Information

In inquiry into the functioning of economic and social systems, a different measure of informational
association may be more useful. We are often interested in learning not about the informational
content shared among a number of variables but in how much of the uncertainty in a single degree
of freedom X0 is removed when we observe values taken by a set Xk = {X1 , ..., Xk } of other degrees
of freedom. Put differently, we are often interested in the informational account of X0 given by the
elements in Xk : How much do we know about individual values x0 taken by X0 based on knowledge
or observation of χk = {x1 , ..., xk }.
This may come up as part of general inquiry into the dynamic co-determinations between all
42
The concepts outlined so far have been recently used to guide inquiry into patterns of segregation across occupation and levels of education on the basis of gender. See Puyenbroeck et al., 2012.
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these variables. It may also come up in settings where we know X0 has no or very weak causal
influence over members of the set Xn , in which case the informational equivalence can be taken as
a measure of the extent to which the latter degrees of freedom combine to determine values of X0 .
To characterize this kind of informational accounting, a measure of joint mutual information is
more useful.43 Defining it first for a setting with three degrees of freedom, consider,

I (X0 ; (X1 , X2 )) = H (X0 ) − H (X0 | (X1 , X2 ))

(5)

Which measures the reduction in uncertainty about values of X0 once values of X1 and X2 are
taken into account. The relationship between this measure and the conditional mutual information
can be easily established. Adding H (X0 |X1 ) − H (X0 |X1 ) = 0 to this definitions yields,
I (X0 ; (X1 , X2 )) = (H (X0 ) − H (X0 |X1 )) − (H (X0 |X1 ) − H (X0 | (X1 , X2 )))
(6)
= I (X0 , X1 ) + I (X0 , X2 |X1 )
The joint mutual information between X0 and (X1 , X2 ) is the sum of the mutual information
between X0 and X1 and a conditional mutual information—the information gained about X0 upon
observation of X2 when X1 is already known. This results in a measure of the total reduction in
uncertainty about X0 arising from joint observation of X1 and X2 .
The multivariate generalization of this measure for X0 and a set Xk of n other degrees of freedom
that may take individual values χn = {x1 , x2 , ..., xk } may also be defined recursively,
I (X0 , Xk ) = H (X0 ) − H (X0 |Xk )
= (H (X0 ) − H (X0 |Xk−1 )) + (H (X0 |Xk−1 ) − H (X0 |Xk ))

(7)

= I (X0 , Xk−1 ) + I (X0 , Xk |Xk−1 )
In many applications in economic and social inquiry, we are interested in a more general decomposition, separating the variables in Xk into two mutually exclusive sets, Xe containing e of the
43

Measures equivalent to this have been motivated and used in computational biology and in work on model feature
selection. See Yang and Moody, 1999; Bennasar et al., 2015, and Ince, 2017, for instance.
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k individual degrees of freedom, and its complement in Xk , Xi , containing the remaining i = k − e
ones,
I (X0 ; Xk ) = (H (X0 ) − H (X0 |Xe )) + (H (X0 |Xe ) − H (X0 |Xk ))

(8)

= I (X0 ; Xe ) + I (X0 ; Xi |Xe )
The total, joint informational association of the degrees of freedom in Xk and the variable of interest
X0 is given by the joint mutual information between the latter and the variables in the set Xe plus
the incremental information gained about X0 upon observation of Xi when Xe is already known.
Since the degrees of freedom in each two sets Xe and Xi are being considered jointly, it is also
possible to consider the tripartite mutual information,

I (X0 , Xe , Xi ) = I (X0 , Xe ) − I (X0 , Xe | Xi ) = I (X0 , Xe ) + I (X0 , Xi ) − I (X0 , Xk )

(9)

The joint mutual information in 8 can be decomposed into the two measures of conditional or
incremental mutual information defined by Xe and Xi and the mutual information between X0 and
the two sets.

I (X0 ; Xk ) = I (X0 ; Xe |Xi ) + I (X0 ; Xi |Xe ) + I (X0 , Xe , Xi )

(10)

There are many settings where we are interested in this decomposition of the total association
between a quantity of interest and two sets of variables into the incremental association of each
set of variables, and their indistinguishable, joint association with the quantity of interest. Income
and sets of economic and social-identity characteristics are a notable and important instance.

3.3

Coefficients of Informational Association

Normalized versions of the measures of informational association defined above offer useful quantifications. Consider first the coefficient of joint mutual information between X0 and Xk , which
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measures the extent to which the former is informationally equivalent to the latter,

A (X0 ||Xk ) ≡

I (X0 , Xk )
H (X0 |Xk )
=1−
H (X0 )
H (X0 )

(11)

It should be obvious that A (X0 ||Xk ) ∈ [0, 1], with A (X0 ||Xk ) = 1 only when the informational
account of X0 provided by Xk is deterministic, leaving no uncertainty about all individual measures
x0 when the corresponding values χk taken by Xk are known. We may term a degree of freedom
Xi in an account provided by Xk independent if A (Xi ||Xj ) = 0, ∀Xj ∈ Xk , j 6= i. An account may
be termed orthogonal if all the degrees of freedom involved are independent.
There should be no expectation that analysis of complex social systems can even approximately
result in deterministic or orthogonal accounts. But in social inquiry, we can often make some
progress toward understanding the influences on a degree of freedom X0 by considering measures
of its incremental and mutual informational association with two mutually exclusive subsets of Xk ,
Xe and Xi ,

IXe |Xi ≡

I (X0 ; Xi |Xe )
I (X0 , Xe , Xi )
I (X0 ; Xe |Xi )
; IXi |Xe ≡
; M (X0 , Xe , Xi ) ≡
H (X0 )
H (X0 )
H (X0 )

(12)

These conventions permit a number of different ways to express the decomposition of A (X0 ||Xk ),

A (X0 ||Xk ) = A (X0 ||Xe ) + (1 − A (X0 ||Xe )) A (X0 |Xe ||Xi )
= A (X0 ||Xe ) + IXi |Xe = A (X0 ||Xi ) + IXe |Xi

(13)

= IXi |Xe + IXe |Xi + M (X0 , Xe , Xi )
The total proportional reduction in uncertainty about X0 can be divided into the coefficient of
unconditional informational association between X0 and one of the two sets of individual degrees
of freedom, and the coefficient of incremental informational association between X0 and the other
set of individual degrees of freedom. It can also be expressed as a sum of the two coefficients
of incremental informational association, minus the coefficient of mutual informational association
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between X0 , Xe , and Xi .
The sign of M (X0 , Xe , Xi ) reveals an important informational relationship between these degrees
of freedom. Formally, M (X0 , Xe , Xi ) < 0 ⇔ IXi |Xe > A (X0 ||Xi ) ⇔ IXe |Xi > A (X0 ||Xe ). That
is, the coefficient of mutual information will be negative in any and all cases of “informational
synergy” between the two sets of degrees of freedom and X0 . This occurs whenever the incremental
informational association of each set Xe , Xi with X0 is greater than its respective unconditional
informational association with X0 . In those cases, knowledge of one set of degrees of freedom
reduces more uncertainty about X0 if the other degree of freedom is already known. There is
information about X0 in the combination of Xe and Xi that is not contained in either of those two
sets individually.
Conversely, in settings where M (X0 , Xe , Xi ) > 0 there is a measure of redundancy between the
two sets of degrees of freedom in informationally accounting for X0 . The two sets of individual
degrees of freedom contain some of the same information about X0 .

4

Individual Income and Its Categorical Determinants

The concepts and approach outlined above can be applied to inquiry into the associations involved in the determination of individual income. Specifically, they enable characterizations of
the informational associations between income and sets of observable economic and social-identity
characteristics. This section develops part-piecewise representations of the indices developed above
that allow such characterizations, within a broader analytical framework for considering the informational determinants of individual income.

4.1

Categorical Degrees of Freedom and Part-Piecewise Representations

Formally, let Y be an individual degree of freedom measuring income over a given time period, and
let f be the (marginal) frequency distribution of individuals over a coarse-graining of the range of
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possible income values into m bins. The entropy of this distribution is given by,44

H (Y ) = −

X

fm log fm

(14)

m

As noted above, this is a measure of heterogeneity, diversity, or differentiation in individual measures of income. It takes a maximum value of log m when income is distributed with maximum
heterogeneity, evenly across all possible income levels. It’s minimum possible value is zero, when all
incomes take on the same value. H (Y ) is also a measure of how much uncertainty an observer of
the distribution f has about the exact distribution of income across each specific individual—given
by the average number of bits needed to enumerate all permutations of individuals across income
levels possible under f .
Let Xk be a set of observable categorical individual degrees of freedom. That set may be
divided into a subset Xe of observable “economic” categories—specifically, level of education or age
group—and another subset Xi of social-identity categories. Since present flows of individual income
cannot be expected to have any causal influence on an individual’s social identity, age, or level of
education, the informational associations between Y and all elements of Xk can be understood
as informational measures of the influence those elements have in the determination of individual
measures of income.
Since all elements of Xk are categorical variables, it will be useful to consider a partially pointwise
decomposition of the coefficient of informational association defined in 13 across all individual values
χk taken by Xk ,

A (Y ||Xk ) =

X

f (χk ) a (Y ||χk ) ;

a (Y ||χk ) ≡

χk
44

H (Y ) − H (Y |χk )
H (Y )

(15)

It is important to noteP
that this is different than the entropy-index of income inequality proposed by Theil, 1971.
That index is given by − n yn log yn , where yn is the share of total income received by each of the n = 1, ..., N
individuals in the system. While this index has a number of useful properties, its relationship to the combinatorial
considerations that make entropy a useful conceptual tool in analysis of large-N economic systems is not at all clear.
From the perspective developed in what follows, the convention in Theil, 1971 amounts to taking units of income as
the functional units of an economy, and considering that they may take “states” corresponding to different individuals.
This is an impractical basis for descriptions of economic functioning, not least because money is fungible and income
is a flow (and hence a poor unit of analysis over any specific time period).
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The coefficients of joint pointwise informational association a (X0 ||χk ) measure the proportional
reduction in heterogeneity or observer uncertainty about Y once it is verified that Xk = χk . Put
differently, it is a proportional, informational measure of the heterogeneity in values of individual
income in the sub-population defined by χk , relative to the heterogeneity in values of individual
income across the population as a whole.
Note that even though A (Y ||Xk ) is always non-negative, values of a (Y ||χk ) can be negative.
This occurs when a χk sub-population has greater heterogeneity in income levels than the population
as a whole. In those cases, the measures in Xk have a greater informational influence on incomes
within sub-populations with Xk 6= χk than on incomes for individuals with χk characteristics. Put
differently, factors other than those contained in Xk have a greater informational role in shaping
the heterogeneity of individual income within sub-population χk than within the population as a
whole.
The point-wise coefficients of joint informational association inside the sum in 15 admit the
same kind of decomposition into two sets of individual degrees of freedom or characteristics as
above. Denoting those sets by Xe and Xi this may be formally expressed as,
a (Y ||χk ) = a (Y ||χe ) + Iχi |χe = a (Y ||χi ) + Iχe |χi

(16)

= Iχi |χe + Iχe |χi + m (Y, χe , χi )
Where Iα|β and m (Y, α, β) are part-pointwise versions of the coefficients of incremental association
defined in 12. The relationship between the part-pointwise coefficient of mutual association and its
population-wide version follows trivially,
M (Y, Xe , Xi ) =

X

f (χe , χi ) m (Y, χe , χi )

χe ,χi

where,

(17)

m (Y, χe , χi ) = a (Y ||χe ) − Iχe |χi = a (Y ||χi ) − Iχi |χe
= a (Y ||χe ) + a (Y ||χi ) − a (Y ||χk )
This coefficient reflects an important aspect of the informational association between Y and
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pairs χk = (χe , χi ) of individual characteristics. As with the population coefficient of mutual information, one broad way to characteritze what m captures is by considering its sign. Any pair with
m (Y, χe , χi ) < 0 can be understood to have a pointwise “synergistic” informational association with
Y . For such pairs, their incremental informational association coefficients, Iχe |χi , Iχe |χi are greater
than their respective unconditional coefficients of informational association, a (Y ||χe ) , a (Y ||χi ).
Equivalently, their joint coefficient of informational association with Y is greater than the sum of
their respective coefficients of informational association with Y . There is information about individual income in the combination of characteristics (χe , χi ) that is not contained in either of those
characteristics by themselves. Conversely, characteristic pairs (χe , χi ) for which m (Y, χe , χi ) > 0
have measures of redundancy in their informational association with Y . Note that pairs (χe , χi ) can
be redundant or synergistic even when the sets Xe and Xi are synergetic or redundant, respectively.
The piecewise mutual information coefficient has a more general interpretation and significance.
It is a negative measure of informational association between a set of economic characteristics χe
and income for a group χi , relative to the overall informational association between those economic
characteristics and income for the entire population: m (Y, χe , χi ) = a (Y ||χe ) − Iχe |χi . It may be
taken as a measure of the comparative informational significance of those characteristics for the
income of each social-identity group.
Three general results follow from 16 and 17. First, note that 16 defines a simple measure of
within-group comparative incremental informational association between income and two sets of
characteristics (χe , χi ) within the sub-population they define,

de,i ≡ Iχe |χi − Iχi |χe = a (Y ||χe ) − a (Y ||χi )

(18)

This difference measures the independent informational association of χe and Y relative to the
independent informational association of χi and Y for group (χe , χi ). Interestingly, this difference
can be computed by considering only the population-wide informational association between the
set of economic characteristics χe and income, and the equivalent measure of the social identity χi .
This allows estimation over a lower-dimensional coarse-graining than direct estimation of de,i .
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w
Second, the difference of de,i across two identity groups, χm
i and χi , also offers a useful quantifi-

cation of the role played by social identity in the determination of income distribution. Formally,
that difference is given by,

m
∆im ,iw ≡ de,im − de,iw = a (Y ||χw
i ) − a (Y ||χi )

(19)

m
Whenever a (Y ||χm
i ) < a (Y ||χi ), any set of economic characteristics will be more informationally

significant relative to identity in the determination of the distribution of income within population
χim than in the determination of the distribution of income within population χiw . The simple and
m
easily estimated difference ∆im ,iw = a (Y ||χw
i ) − a (Y ||χi ) thus offers a quick, macroscopic measure

of discriminatory treatment across all possible individual economic characteristics.
Finally, from 17 it is possible to consider the difference between the coefficient of mutual information m (Y, χe , χi ) across two social-identity groups, χvi and χhi ,


m (Y, χe , χvi ) − m Y, χe , χhi = Iχe |χh − Iχe |χvi
i

(20)

The coefficient of mutual information for group χvi will be larger than the equivalent measure for
group χhi if the incremental measure of informational association of the economic characteristics
in question is greater for χhi than for χvi . Differences in values of m across two groups give us a
negative measure of the independent informational influence the set of economic characteristics χe
has on the income of each group.
The part-piecewise coefficients developed above allow formal, non-paramteric characterizations
of various informational associations and interactions between economic and social-identity characteristics and individual income. Those characterizations are defined within the broader terms
of an information-theoretic framework that situates those associations within the broader set of
determinations of values of Y . This allows integration of inquiry into the effects of patterns of
discrimination by elements of social identity and inquiry into the full set of determinants of individual income. A first step toward such an undertaking is offered below, on the basis of large-scale,
repeated cross-sectional data from the U.S.
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5

Observed Patterns in U.S. data

The framework can be applied to large-scale U.S. cross-sectional data to cast light onto the associations and interaction between income, social identity, and certain economic characteristics
established by systems of social discrimination in that society. To do this, we considered four waves
of the U.S. Census data, from 1970 to 2000, as well as the 2007-2011 pooled American Community
Survey (hereafter referred to as the 2010 Census for simplicity), extracted from Ruggles et al.,
2015. These surveys provide the most comprehensive and nationally representative source of data
for income estimates across various subpopulations in the United States.45
For each respondent reporting market income, we observe their annual wage Y , economic characteristics χe and social identity χi . We then generate for each year a coarse-grained joint distribution
f (Y, χe , χi ) by “binning” Y into equal-spaced income brackets for each cell defined by categorical
attributes (χe , χi ).46 All indices developed above are estimated for the five annual joint distributions in question. This section reports the salient results of these exercises, starting with those
involving only the two observable characteristics that can be most narrowly understood as “economic,” and then considering the influence of identity and the interaction of identity and economic
characteristics.

5.1

Observable Economic Characteristics

The dataset offers two “economic” characteristics widely understood to shape income: Level of
education and age, which may be broadly associated with years of work experience. The informational associations between those two measures and income are interesting and illustrate well the
distinctive usefulness of coefficients of informational association in the study of the determinants
of individual income.
Sub-populations with higher levels of education not only have higher average wages, but they
also have overall distributions of income with greater measures of heterogeneity or entropy. Put
differently, those with higher levels of education enjoy greater scopes for differentiation in their
45
46

See appendix A.1 for details on the construction of our sample, and appendix A.2 for sample sizes.
For a robustness analysis of the binning scheme, see appendix A.3.
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Figure 3: Average real wages and unconditional informational association between education and
wages. 1970-2010 Census and ACS data.
income. In a manner of speaking, education appears to yield heterogeneity gains to the population
in question, as shown in Figure 3. Those lacking a college degree have seen a steady decrease in the
heterogeneity of their distribution of income—ensuring that their levels of educational attainment
have become steadily more informative of their income. This is particularly dramatic for the wellstudied category of high-school dropouts. By 2010 their educational attainment accounted for
almost 20 percent of the informational content in their distribution of income. At the same time,
college graduates have steadily gained scopes for income differentiation over the past 30 years.
The informational associations of income and age follow a similar pattern. Age is most informative for respondents aged 20-29, and then of decreasing importance as workers advance in their
career, as shown in Figure 4. There does appear to be a reversal for ages 60-64, when workers are
reaching retirement age. The informational association of young age and wage incomes appears to
be increasing over the period 1970-2010. Not only are wages most strongly determined by age for
the young, this is also the group with the lowest average wage.
Education and experience appear to generate heterogeneity gains for the sub-populations in
question. More insights into the conjugation of the effects of education and experience can be
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Figure 4: Average real wages and unconditional informational association between age and wages.
1970-2010 Census and ACS data.
obtained from considering the coefficient of incremental informational association of educational
attainment for each age group, Iχeduc |χage . The evolution of these measures across age and educationlevel groups is shown for three years of observation in Figure 5.
Four features of this figure stand out. First, the informational significance of education does not
change very much across age groups for those without a high-school degree. For that population,
age and experience do not appear to translate into heterogeneity gains. Second, for all other groups,
education results in heterogeneity gains that start to grow with age and experience, reach a peak,
and then decline. Third, heterogeneity gains are greater for those with higher education, for whom
gains are greater and peak later in life. Those with university degrees achieve the greatest measure of
income heterogeneity, in their 50s. Finally, the overall differences in heterogeneity across education
groups have increased dramatically in the past 40 years, across all age groups. These findings give
a new, informational perspective on the well established finding that returns on education have
increased over the past few decades in the U.S.
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Figure 5: Incremental informational association between education and income by age group. 19702010 Census and ACS data.

5.2

The Effects of Social Identity

The dataset also offers fairly detailed information on respondents’ social identity, by gender, race,
and ethnicity. We considered six sub-populations defined by two gender and by three race/ethnicity
categories: black, white, and hispanic. There is considerable variation in the distributions of income
and economic characteristics across these groups. That variation tells us much about the economic
effects of systemic patterns of discrimination by social identity. Three of its features stand out.
First, there is a fairly persistent ordinal ranking in the heterogeneity of distributions of income
across the six groups, with women and minorities enjoying smaller scopes for differentiation by
income. Second, for those groups, the independent informativeness of economic characteristics
relative to that of social identity is always smaller than for white men. And third, measures of the
relative informativeness of educational attainment over levels of income for different groups reveal
a striking pattern: for women, those measures fall as higher levels of educational attainment are
considered. For white men, they increase.
Consider first the unconditional informational association between gender and income. Figure 6
reveals the strong informational impact of being female on income, compared to that of being
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Figure 6: Unconditional informational association between gender and annual and hourly income.
1970-2010 Census and ACS data.
male. Not only do women have lower average incomes, but they also have smaller scopes to achieve
differentiated income outcomes. This doubtlessly reflects in part the fact that, as a reflection
of the social processes shaping expectations about care obligations discussed above, there is a
higher prevalence of part-time employment among women than among men. But the comparative
distributions of hourly earnings show a similar, if moderated, pattern of differential heterogeneity.
Evidence from a number of OECD economies has established that women are concentrated in
a much smaller number of occupations than men. In 2005, that concentration ensured that, on
average, half of employed women had jobs in only eleven of 110 listed occupations in European
OECD countries and the U.S. In contrast, half of employed men were on average concentrated
in the 21 more common occupational categories.47 The patterns evident in Figure 6 illustrate
how entropy differentials across income distributions offer a simple and robust way to measure
the relative “compression” of economic outcomes for women. As will become clear below, those
differentials are important economic manifestations of inequalities by gender and other dimensions
of social identity. They also reveal systematic differences in the comparative informational impact
of economic characteristics on income distributions across identities.
The same pattern of entropy differentials is evident across the six identity groups we considered.
Figure 7 shows the evolution of the informational association between social identity and income
47

OECD, 2005; Puyenbroeck et al., 2012.
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across the four observed levels of educational attainment. In all four panels we observe the same
ordinal pattern, with white men enjoying the greatest scopes for income heterogeneity, followed
by other men, and with Hispanic and Black women experiencing the greatest measures of income
compression or homogeneity. As with women, minorities too suffer from an effective “compression”
or reduction in heterogeneity of incomes compared to white men. This finding is broadly in line
with the finding of greater occupational concentration among minorities than whites.48 But it also
points to a series of further results.
The entropy differentials in Figure 7 establish that social identity plays a significantly stronger
informational role in the determination of incomes for certain groups. Other groups see factors other
than their social identity play stronger informational roles in the determination of their incomes.
Those factors include the economic characteristics in the data we considered, whose associations
and interactions in the formation of income levels point to further economic iniquities born of
systems of discrimination by social identity.
In line with the results established in equations 18 and 19, those differentials imply that the
measure of incremental informational significance in the determination of income of social-identity
characteristics relative to that of economic ones given by de,i is always greater for those groups.
This is illustrated in relation to the two observable economic characteristics in the dataset under
consideration, educational attainment and age, in Figure 8, which shows the evolution of de,i for
those two characteristics across social-identity groups.
The understanding of the coefficients m (Y, χe , χi ) as negative, relative measures of the informational significance of economic characteristics χe in the determination of incomes for group χi ,
and the result expressed in equation 20 lead to a final set of revealing observations. The evolution
of these coefficients for each of the six identity groups we considered is depicted in Figure 9.
In each panel in that figure the ordinal ranking of different identity groups gives us an inverse
ranking of the relative strength of the informational influence of a given level of education in the
determination of incomes across groups. A striking pattern emerges from this. Black and white
women have the lowest measures for those coefficients for low levels of educational attainment. For
48

See Grodsky and Pager, 2001 and Kochhar, 2005.
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college graduates, white men, and in 2010 white women, have the lowest measures. In fact, in all
these cases, m (Y, χe , χi ) is negative, establishing the presence of informational synergies between
education and identity in the formation of income levels in those cases.
The combination of low educational attainment and being a woman is associated with a further
set of determinants that exert a strong influence in the determination of income. Conversely,
the combination of being white and having a college degree is associated with a further set of
determinants that exert a strong influence in the determination of income. It seems clear that the
effects of different educational attainments on income are very much mediated by a broader array
of processes during which social realities of race and gender condition rather iniquitous outcomes.
A stronger and broader version of this result and other findings can be established with the aid
of a final graphical representation of our findings. Let Se,i =

w̄e,i
¯
w̄

be the ratio between the mean

wage of group (χe , χi ) and the mean population wage. Now consider the relationship between this
ratio and m (Y, χe , χi ), which provides a sense of how relative incomes vary as relative measures of
the informational significance of educational level on income vary. This results in the associations
reported in Figure 10.
The figure conveys a number of well-understood features, iniquities, and developments in the
distribution of income in the U.S. over the past four decades. First, the growing range in each panel
for the values of Se,i over time reflects the significant growth in income differentials across levels
of education. Throughout these processes, that range also reveals stark differentials in average pay
for the most and least formally qualified groups across social identity. Second, the relative average
income of almost all groups of people without university degrees has been steadily falling over this
period. White women are the only exception—those with high-school diplomas and some college
have achieved some average increases in relative levels of pay. Third, the average relative income
of college educated groups has grown unevenly across social-identity, with white, college-educated
women securing the most significant relative gains in this period.
The figure also conveys a series of patterns involving differentials in the measures of m (Y, χe , χi ).
First, the curves for all groups of women have a distinctive “tilt,” ensuring they are almost always
upward sloping in this space. They exhibit lower measures of m (Y, χe , χi ) for low levels of education,
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income of education level in question. 1970-2010 Census and ACS data.
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which correspond to low average levels of pay. There is a comparatively strong relative incremental
informational association between their low levels of education and their incomes. In contrast, all
groups of women have higher measures for that coefficient of mutual information for high levels of
education and pay. They enjoy comparatively weak relative incremental informational associations
between their high levels of education and their incomes. Put differently, their educational level
becomes a comparatively weaker informational predictor of their incomes as the level of education
rises. It is a stronger informational predictor as it falls.
Two developments over the past forty years have tended to moderate the strength of this
iniquitous reality. There has been a noticeable and steady increase in the independent informational
significance of education in the determination of incomes for college-educated women. In 2010,
college-educated white women joined college-educated white men as the only groups of collegeeducated people for whom we observe informational synergies between education and identity in
accounting for income. This has not been accompanied by a similar improvement for black and
hispanic women. At the same time, black and hispanic women with no high-school degree have
seen an uneven but discernable decrease in the informational association between their level of
education and their income over the past few decades. Interestingly, white women without highschool degrees have seen an increase in the informational significance of their low level of education
in the determination of their income.
The curves for white men have also have a “tilt,” but one with a negative slope. As their
educational attainment levels increase, educational achievement becomes a comparatively stronger
informational predictor of their incomes. The patterns for black and hispanic men are different.
Across all educational levels, the comparative incremental informational significance of education
for the incomes of hispanic men has been decreasing—resulting in the marked shift to the right in
their curves. The curves for black men are also in part shifting to the right, with the most significant
shift involving a steady decrease in the strength of education as an informational predictor of the
income for college-educated black men.
At the broadest level, these observations strongly suggest that social patterns of discrimination
ensure the returns on educational achievement are very unevenly distributed across social-identity
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groups. This has important implications for our understanding of the possibilities and limits of
individual and social interventions seeking to reduce the economic consequences of discrimination.

6

Discrimination and a Privilege

The discussion above opens new perspectives on the economic consequences of systemic patterns of
discrimination by social identity. It also helps identify a distinctive form of social privilege enjoyed
by those not subject to it.
Systems of discrimination by elements of social identity do not merely result in lower average
incomes for discriminated groups. They ensure that in the market allocation of the social product, social identity plays a pervasive and iniquitous role. It conditions important differences in
the group-wide effects economic characteristics like educational attainment have on income. And
most broadly, it exerts a stronger influence in the formation of individual incomes within discriminated groups. The economic, political, and social processes shaping the incomes of women and
minorities effectively leave individual members of those groups with significantly smaller scopes for
differentiation in economic outcomes on the basis of underlying, economically relevant individual
characteristics. In varying but persistently significant measures, their social identities play an outsized role in the determination of their levels of income. Their economic outcomes reflect the extent
to which they are treated by their gender. By their ethnicity. And by the color of their skin.
The contrast with the treatment received by other groups, as evident from their patterns of
income, is striking. In addition to receiving higher average incomes, white men in the U.S. as
a group enjoy a distinctive and subtle privilege: significantly greater scopes for differentiation by
income among themselves. While that differentiation is doubtlessly shaped by non-economic factors
that limit the possibilities available to many individuals—such as class or regional background,
sexuality, physical traits, and many other characteristics we have been unable to consider here—as
a group, white males are clearly treated by the socio-economic processes shaping incomes in a more
individually discerning manner. This is a privilege not generally enjoyed by other groups.
It is also a difficult privilege to address, because it may not appear as such to those enjoying
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it. Within the privileged group, high measures of differentiation in income by contemporaneous,
observable individual economic characteristics can lend support to “meritocratic” inferences. The
group-wide comparisons offered by this paper point to the problems with such conclusions: Differentiation by “merit” or by any other characteristic is not as widely available to members of other
social identity groups. They also point to further exercises that may help highlight the significance
of other forms of discrimination in the definition of this privilege and of who enjoys it exactly:
exercises that may establish how the narrowing of economic opportunities experienced by women
and minorities may also by experienced by groups of white men defined by class background or
other characteristics.
We hope that in this sense the paper’s methods and findings contribute to further work on
the economic consequences of all forms of social discrimination, and help inform debates on the
kinds of economic outcomes a society that genuinely values all its members“by the content of their
character” would attempt to promote and achieve.49
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Appendices

A.1

Data source and variable construction

The data for this study are drawn from the US decennial census in the years 1970-2000. After
2000, the Census Bureau replaced the more detailed “long” census form (which contains income
questions inter-alia) with an annual nationally representative survey, the American Community
Survey (ACS). We use the pooled ACS data from 2007-2011, but refer to it as the 2010 census for
simplicity.
We have restricted the sample to respondents aged 18-64 not currently living in group quarters
and whose primary occupation was non-military. For the overwhelming majority of working-age
respondents, wages and salaries are the most important source of income in any given year. The
income measure used in this study is therefore the reported annual pre-tax wages and salaries
during the past calendar year (1970-2000) or the past 12 months (2010). We deflate this income
measure to constant US Dollars using the 1999 Consumer Price Index. Since we focus on wage
incomes, we further limit our analysis to respondents reporting at least one week of work in the
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reference year as well as a positive annual wage.
Measuring the differential evolution of heterogeneity in group outcomes requires a definition of
the relevant social space over which agents can differentiate. Some groups may not currently occupy
certain wage income ranges, even though they would be accessible under alternative configurations.
We address this problem by considering the range of wages bounded between zero and the highest
observed value in the data for the sample as a whole. This range will serve as a proxy for the social
space potentially accessible to each subgroup.
A second, related problem concerns alterations of the data to preserve the anonymity of respondents. The most significant such modification consists in the censoring of very high earners,
which means that wages of respondents above a certain threshold are replaced with a common
value. Although relatively small in number, these so-called “top-coded” observations introduce
distortions into the wage distribution. In particular, top-coding will tend to unduly homogenize
wage incomes. As a first attempt at dealing with this problem, we choose to remove the top two
percentiles of observations in each year.
We consider wages ranging between 0 and a year-specific maximum value based on the 98th
percentile. Within this range, we generate 34 equally spaced histogram cells to construct the coarsegrained distribution f (y, χe , χi ).50 The complex survey design of the Census and ACS data requires
the use of sampling weights. These weights inflate the importance of individual observations to
make the sample representative of the total population. The weights are summed up for of all
observations within each cell defined by an income range (y, y + δ) and a combination of (χe , χi ).
Social identity χi is analyzed through a very simple scheme with two gender categories, men and
women, and four race categories: non-hispanic blacks and whites, hispanics, and a residual category
of other races. The race variable is constructed by Ruggles et al., 2015 in an attempt to create
consistent categories on the basis of the original racial and ethnic self-identification questions,
which varied across census years. Notably, individuals with multiple responses were assigned a
single response based on other demographic attributes of the individual and their area of residence.
While hispanic origin was asked directly of respondents in 1980 and later, it was imputed in 1970 on
50

See appendix A.3

47

the basis of parents’ and grandparents’ birthplace among other information (Ruggles et al., 2015).
The residual “other races” category combines diverse groups such as American Indian and Asian,
making the results hard to interpret. We therefore omit this category from the plots, although it
was used in the calculations.
Economic characteristics χe are limited to education and experience. We use age grouped
by decade to proxy for experience. Our education measure is based on the harmonized ‘EDUC’
variable, which represents either years of completed schooling or attained degree. We then collapse
this variable into four broad education groups: Less than High School (Nursery school to Grade 11),
High School Graduate (Grade 12), Some College (up to three years of college), College Graduate
(four or more years of college).

A.2

Sample size

The census data sets used in this study are 1% or 5% samples of the national population. After
application of the selection rules outlined in appendix A.1, the final sample sizes per year remain
substantial. A final adjustment was made to exclude cases with missing values on either social identity, economic characteristics or wage information. Table 1 shows the sample sizes for calculations
involving both social identity and educational achievement.

A.3

Binning scheme

Discrete frequency distributions of annual wages were formed by grouping observations into 34
equally spaced histogram bins. In order to assess the robustness of the key findings in this paper,
some calculations were repeated using a binning scheme with 24 bins instead. The results are
qualitatively identical to those presented in the main body of the paper, as the following comparisons
show.
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Year
1970
1970
1970
1970
1970
1970
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010

Identity
Black Men
Black Women
Hispanic Men
Hispanic Women
White Men
White Women
Black Men
Black Women
Hispanic Men
Hispanic Women
White Men
White Women
Black Men
Black Women
Hispanic Men
Hispanic Women
White Men
White Women
Black Men
Black Women
Hispanic Men
Hispanic Women
White Men
White Women
Black Men
Black Women
Hispanic Men
Hispanic Women
White Men
White Women

Less than HS
47597
37740
19538
11108
261573
154769
88590
71874
76963
47700
451383
296628
49054
41797
97168
56353
275601
184978
37835
37379
152599
81853
196825
131188
24582
24699
135238
74481
121329
76263

HS Graduate
20317
23659
7868
6833
248456
231591
82399
95486
43020
40274
804133
792951
92850
102665
71513
60227
794572
766198
135743
158380
142383
115708
978455
900990
118256
130839
167596
132403
893388
779487

Some College
6019
6744
3279
2180
106876
78829
40975
49931
24223
19368
417535
366706
61153
88411
50378
49585
668303
692206
66406
97717
58402
60884
555043
585423
72780
112855
82872
92845
591341
652105

College Grad
3308
4654
2067
1081
96718
58314
20711
26944
12643
8566
424329
288578
26591
38923
20206
18198
526815
462415
40522
61822
33944
35562
615719
618360
51198
85907
55484
67616
744587
830034

Total
77241
72797
32752
21202
713623
523503
232675
244235
156849
115908
2097380
1744863
229648
271796
239265
184363
2265291
2105797
280506
355298
387328
294007
2346042
2235961
266816
354300
441190
367345
2350645
2337889

Table 1: Sample sizes by year, social identity and educational achievement group. Census and ACS
data.
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